Abstract: Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. 27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51   2   Abstract  52  53  54 Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of 55 humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to 56 engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in 57 chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human 58 social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish 59 between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring 60 whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary precursors of universal social norms seen in 61 humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: 62 tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, 63
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Introduction
79
Recent genetic studies suggest that the hominin lineage and the one giving rise to 80 chimpanzees split as recently as 6-7 million years ago (Glazko and Nei 2003; Goodman et al. 81 1998; Ruvolo 1997 , for a review). In evolutionary terms, this is a short period of time. 82
Consequently, humans and chimpanzees share numerous similarities in terms of both 83 cognition and behaviour (Boesch 2007 ; de Waal 2005; Tomasello and Call 1997) . 84
Chimpanzees manufacture and use tools (Goodall 1986 ). They exhibit significant cultural 85 variation between communities (Whiten et al. 1999 ) and show a remarkably rich social life 86 (de Waal 1982) . They hunt cooperatively (Boesch 1994) , share food and, like humans, engage 87 in inter-group killings (Wrangham 1999) . Recent findings also confirm that chimpanzees 88 possess simple elements of a theory of mind (Call 2007; Call and Tomasello 2008) . Yamamoto et al. 2009 ) and occasionally also do so even spontaneously 100 (Warneken et al. 2007) . However, studies that tested chimpanzees' tendencies to behave 101 prosocially in food-delivering experiments have so far yielded only negative results (Jensen et In sum, most of the existing studies exploring possible building blocks of human 104 moral behaviour in chimpanzees have capitalized on their tendencies and capacities to behave 105 prosocially in different contexts. Here, we focus on another element of human moral 106 behaviour i.e. on social norms, specifically on those related to harm. We recognize that the 107 question of what exactly moral behaviour is or what it comprises leads to difficult and quite 108 controversial ethical as well as meta-ethical discussions. However, there seems to be 109 consensus that social norms, especially those dealing with harm, constitute an important 110 element of moral behaviour (Bernard 2008) . Here, we explore in a comprehensive way 111 whether evolutionary precursors of such norms are present in our closest living relatives, the 112 chimpanzees. Our approach consists in focusing on the existence of bystander reactions upon 113 potential norm violations. By focusing on uninvolved bystanders, rather than on direct victims 114 of potential norm violations, we are able to exclude that reactions to norm violations are 115 simple responses to the violation of individual interests but rather are based on more 116 generalized expectations about -how one ought to behave‖ (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) . 117
Thus, we use uninvolved bystanders as a critical test case. 118
Many terms we employ are commonly used in the empirically oriented moral-119 psychological as well as -sociological literature. We are aware of the complex philosophical 120 debate on some of these terms. However, since a thorough philosophical explanation of them 121 is beyond the scope of this paper, we apply commonly used definitions for the purpose of this 122 paper. 123 124
Human social norms 125
Human morality comprises a spectrum of complex phenomena, ranging from moral 126 emotions and moral behaviour to moral reasoning, moral judgment and to abstract concepts of 127 right and wrong (Greene and Haidt 2002 ). Yet, in our daily lives morality comes almost 128 naturally to us. We don't jump the queue and we help the elderly or handicapped. In other 129 words, we behave morally and do so often without previous deliberate consideration of the 130 pros and cons of such behaviour. Generally, human moral behaviour reflects a set of 131 particular values and principles, both of which are often embedded in social norms. Social 132 norms are such an integral part of our social life (Jasso 2001 ; Sober and Wilson 1998) that we 133 are often completely unaware of their omnipresence and our automatic adherence to them 134 (Young 2002 ). These norms shape our family life (Bott 2003) as well as our relations with 135 friends, the opposite sex (Kanazawa and Still 2001; Scott 2000) and even with strangers. 136
They regulate politics (Axelrod 1986 ; Khagram et al. 2002) , the economy (Platteau 2000) , 137 and even what we wear and eat. Their social function includes the promotion of cooperation 138 (Axelrod 1986 ) and social order (Elster 1989 ) and the smoothening of social interactions in 139 general. 140
To make things more complicated, social norms can be explicit or implicit. In the 141 former case, they are either written down or spoken about openly, but in the latter, they are 142 not openly stated and maybe not even consciously represented. This raises an important 143 problem. How can outsiders know what is considered a norm within a certain society? In 144 humans, this problem is easily solvable provided we are able to speak the local language. We 145 can simply ask people what they consider as appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in their 146 society, and deduce the underlying social norms. But since our focus in this paper is on 147 chimpanzees, a nonverbal species, we need to adopt another approach than language to find 148 out which behaviours, if any, they might consider appropriate or inappropriate. 149
Social norms can be understood as behavioural regularities that are normative (i.e. 150 entail a sense of oughtness in the moral sense) to a varying degree and generate social 151 expectations (Hechter and Opp 2001; Horne 2001) . We expect others to do or not to do 152 certain things. These expectations don't have to be experienced consciously by the individual, 153 but their satisfaction or violation might produce distinct reactions, thus making these 154 expectations amenable to observation from the outside. Thus, when these expectations are 155 fulfilled we expect to observe no, neutral or perhaps even positive reactions such as friendly 156 remarks or a smile. However, when a certain behaviour violates these expectations, then 157 negative reactions almost always ensue (Hauser 2006) . Notably, negative reactions are not 158 only shown by the victims of a violation, the second parties (Fehr and Gächter 2002) , but 159 most importantly also by uninvolved bystanders, the third-parties (Fehr and Fischbacher 160 2004) . Uninvolved bystanders can generally be defined as individuals who witness a norm 161 violation and who have no particular relationship (i.e. kin or friendship) with the victim(s). 162
While negative reactions from victims might simply reflect a reaction to the damage to 163 individual interests, negative reactions from bystanders can be regarded as moral behaviour, 164 since they provide no apparent benefits to the performers. Indeed, they may be costly in terms 165 of emotional discomfort and risk of provoking retaliation (Horne 2001 ). Thus, the existence 166 of negative reactions of bystanders towards specific behaviours allows us to draw inferences 167 about the existence of social norms and moral behaviour on a nonverbal level. This is not to 168 say that all social norms can be identified by means of negative reactions in bystanders. There 169 might be social norms being present in the absence of such reactions. However, if negative 170 reactions in bystanders do occur towards specific behaviours then we regard them as good 171 evidence for the existence of social norms in a given social group, especially on a nonverbal 172
level. 173
Negative reactions from bystanders may comprise bewilderment, anger or even 174 indignation towards a violation. The fact that they associate different kinds of emotions with 175 different kinds of violations (Hauser 2006; Nichols 2004 Nichols , 2002 Turiel 2005 ) exemplifies the 176 above-mentioned degree to which a behavioural regularity is normative. For example, a 177 violation of the behavioural regularity not to talk aloud in a silent train compartment tends to 178 be associated with relatively flat emotional responses like angry looks or grumbling whereas a 179 violation of the behavioural regularity not to maltreat a child is highly emotionally charged 180 and elicits vehement emotional reactions such as indignation. Thus, behavioural regularities 181 of the former that are associated with relatively cool emotional responses are sometimes 182 referred to as conventions rather than norms (Bicchieri 2006 ). However, there may be various 183 gradations and levels of emotional response to violations that make it inevitably difficult to 184 make a precise distinction between conventions and norms (Young 2008 contents. Furthermore, they are relative to social systems which means that they vary 196 geographically as well as temporally between and even within different societies (Turiel 197 1983) . In other words, they are culturally based and therefore their innate basis is limited. including tool use, grooming or courtship (Whiten et al. 1999 ). Such behaviours spread within 205 a community through social learning (Whiten 1998; Whiten et al. 1996) and individuals are 206 more likely to adopt them as they become more common within a group explanation, however, could be that using them may simply be more efficient than using 218 alternatives because their meaning is certain to be understood. Thus, chimpanzees might only 219 groom in a specific way, i.e. adopt a specific posture, because this might be the most 220 functional and efficient way to groom specific body parts of the grooming partner, given their 221 behaviour, and thus grooming partners might coordinate their activities to achieve this 222 physical end rather than a social one (i.e. follow a specific convention). In short, their 223 behaviours might simply reflect responses to physical affordances that, as a by-product, lead 224 to uniformity. Tool using techniques most likely follow this principle. They are characterized 225 by a functional and goal-directed task and constitute efficient means to achieve physical ends; 226 for example, termites must be extracted from their mound to be eaten. Thus, chimpanzees 227 most certainly do not use specific tools because everybody else does so, although this might 228 be the case for an individual's first use of a tool, but because after some experience they 229 understand the utility and effectiveness of the practice (Bonnie et al. 2007; Turiel 1983) . 230
Whether specific cultural behavioural variants really constitute conventions or whether they 231 are best described as statistical behavioural regularities, will be discussed later in this paper 232 (see Section 3.). 233
Cultural social norms: In humans, the repertoire of cultural variants in behaviour 234 patterns seems to be infinite thanks to our highly elaborated capacity for cumulative culture 235 (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Tomasello 1999 ). Importantly, humans often assign to such 236 cultural behavioural regularities a strong normative component and hence conformity to them 237 is often compulsory. An extreme example of this kind is veiling, which may be associated 238 with strong emotional reactions when women fail to conform (Moghadam 2003) . We classify 239 such behavioural regularities as cultural social norms. Since they are, like conventions, 240 culturally based, their content is also highly arbitrary and therefore variable and varies in 241 space and time (Murdock 1967 ). However, we will leave aside this kind of social norms for 242
we expect them to be absent beyond the human species (Boyd and Richerson 1987) this capacity seems to emerge early in ontogeny (Nucci and Turiel 1978; Smetana 1981, 249 2006; Smetana and Braeges 1990). Given these two facts, it seems plausible and most 250 parsimonious to assume that norms against harm might constitute a species universal. 251 Furthermore, the fact that harmful behaviour generates strong emotional responses (Nichols 252 2002) indicates, in turn, that norms prohibiting harmful behaviour are perceived as highly 253 normative and consequently imply compulsive conformity. Importantly, the strong emotional 254 reactions towards harm-related violations largely emanate from our capacity to empathize 255 with the harmed victim whereas the emotional reactions towards the violation of a convention 256 or a cultural social norm are not necessarily empathy-driven but rather emanate from the fact 257 that -someone failed to behave properly‖. egocentric level of empathy they would, in an appropriate experimental paradigm, no longer 332 display mere emotional contagion when confronted with a distressed conspecific but would 333 instead be able to regulate their own distress to some extent due to improved regulatory 334 control. Furthermore, they would be able to show initial other-regard. However, their 335 response to the other's need would reflect what would be appropriate for them in the same 336 situation, regardless whether it would satisfy the other's need. For example, children, 337 performing on this level of empathy, are reported to bring their own favourite toys to comfort 338 their crying friends instead of the friends' favourite toy (Hoffman 1979 (Hoffman , 2000 . 339
Only on the level of veridical empathy a complete separation of self and other's 340 distress is achieved, enabling an appropriate response to the other's specific needs (Zahn- However, the authors also emphasize that chimpanzee's helping behaviour in these 347 experiments might not stem from a representation of the other's emotional state but simply 348 from an understanding of the other's goal and the underlying motivation to reach it. Taken 349 together, these findings indicate that chimpanzees possess elaborate social expertise and 350 cognitive skills, both of which are rarely seen in the animal kingdom. However, they are not 351 yet sufficient as evidence for a capacity to engage in moral behaviour. 352
To establish whether evolutionary precursors of moral behaviour in chimpanzees 353 occur, we have to investigate whether they, like humans, react to norm violations as 354 uninvolved bystanders. We will argue that an essential precondition for the evolution of social 355 norms is the existence of -personal norms‖, representing the personal expectations of how an 356 individual wants to be treated, because it seems implausible that one would form expectations 357 about how others should be treated before forming expectations about how oneself wants to 358 be treated. Evidence of such -personal norms‖ in chimpanzees is ample and discussed below. Furthermore, there is experimental evidence that chimpanzees -punish‖ conspecifics that steal 369 their food by pulling a rope that causes the food platform to collapse and the food to fall out 370 of the thief's reach (Jensen et al. 2007 ). This experiment supports anecdotal observations that 371 chimpanzees treat food, including highly valued food such as meat, with remarkable -respect 372 for ownership‖ (Goodall 1971; Mitani 2009 ) and hence possibly expect others not to steal it. 373
Chimpanzees also protest when they don't receive support from their coalition partners in 374 agonistic encounters (de Waal 1982 (de Waal , 1996 , when they have no access to a preferred grooming 375 partner, when grooming is not provided or when they become the victim of aggression for no 376 apparent reason thereby serving as scapegoats for dominants (own observations). These 377 protests may take the form of temper tantrums, which involve hysterical ear-piercing 378 screaming, hitting the ground or body and chasing off the -offender‖ (Brosnan 2006; de Waal 379 1996) , and are comparable to those seen in young children (Potegal 2000 relationships but also about the relationships of others in their community (de Waal 1996) . 404
However, the exact motivations underlying the above-mentioned behaviours may be diverse 405 and difficult to disentangle. For example, an alternative explanation for policing behaviour 406 might be that interveners are just annoyed by the disturbance and take action to put a stop to it 407 (Goodall 1986) . characteristics, her social status and her mothering experience, she will allow other group 436 members to come close and to watch the baby intently. In captivity, and probably also in the 437 wild, it can be observed that adults, knowing about the protective nature of mothers, respect 438 the intimacy between the mother and her newborn by keeping their distance, but nevertheless 439 attentively watching the pair. However, infants and juveniles, with their impetuous behaviour, 440 will take every opportunity to try to sneak a peek of the newborn or to touch it. This often 441 provokes hostility or restrictive behaviour from the mother. However, they will soon have 442 learned their lesson and adjust their behaviour towards the baby and its mother and will sit 443 quietly next to the mother by simply observing her and her newborn (Hess 1997) . It seems 444 that from childhood on (but also later) chimpanzees learn that infants in their midst are 445 objects of special treatment by learning to recognize the contingencies between their own 446 behaviour towards the infant and the reaction of the mother and to behave in a way that does 447 not provoke negative reactions from the mother (de Waal 1991). First contacts between group 448 members and the newborn occur on average 6 weeks after the infant's birth and are 449 characterized by gentle touches, sniffing and grooming. As the infants grow older, at the age 450 of around 6 months, other group members are also allowed to hold them and play with them 451 (van Lawick-Goodall 1968). This even includes adult males (see Fig. 1 ). Chimpanzees exhibit 452 towards infants in their midst an extreme tolerance afforded to no other age-sex class. Infants 453 are allowed to climb over adults, to jump on their shoulders, to steal their food or tools and 454 even to interfere during mating. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to observe adult males 455 share their food with infants that sit next to them while they are eating (Bennett 1996 inter-as well as intra-community killings from 7 different chimpanzee communities that have 499 been observed for more than 2 decades (Murray et al. 2007 ; see also Townsend 2007 ). Since 500 chimpanzees are a highly territorial species and engage in coalitional killing of neighbours 501 (Wrangham 1999) , infanticide between communities is not as puzzling as intra-community 502 infanticide, which is in virtually all cases performed by non-kin of both sexes (Goodall 1977 ; 503 But how can the presence of an evolutionary precursor of a social norm not to harm 512 infants be reconciled with the occurrence of intra-community infanticide performed by non-513 kin in chimpanzee communities? In the same way as in humans: Social norms reflect the 514 interest of society (e.g. a trustworthy social environment), which may be at odds with those of 515 particular individuals (e.g. paternity certainty). The fact that bad things happen does not imply 516 that social norms against them do not existent. On the contrary, social norms exist because 517 bad things happen. We must not forget that natural selection favours individuals that are 518 highly adaptable in their behaviour and thus will show strategic and tactic behavioural 519 responses towards external as well as internal circumstances (Fuentes 1999; Sommer 2000) . 520
Especially nonhuman primates exhibit such complexity in their behaviour (Fuentes 1999 problem with such incidents is that they not only occur infrequently but also unexpectedly 547 and are highly chaotic by nature. This makes it very difficult for observers to keep track of 548 every single individual and to report its distinct reactions. Only more systematic evidence of 549 bystander reactions in the context of severe aggression against infants will allow us to 550 distinguish whether such behaviours are indeed the result of a violation of an expectation 551 about how to treat infants or whether there are alternative explanations for such behaviours. 552
Furthermore, we have to show that completely uninvolved bystanders react towards severe 553 aggression against infants, for this would constitute the most unequivocal evidence for the 554 existence of social expectations of how to treat infants in chimpanzees. This is only achieved 555 with the help of well-controlled experiments, as we will detail below. 556
In what follows, we first propose a preliminary theoretical framework that allows us to 557 decide whether a specific behavioural regularity observed in chimpanzees is merely 558 statistical, or whether it might qualify as an evolutionary precursor of a social norm, as such, 559 and hence might have the function to prescribe behaviour. Then, we propose a preliminary 560 gradient from quasi social norms to collective social norms, drawing on the example of 561 appropriate social interactions with infants. For that, we assume that specific psychological 562 mechanisms that evoke tolerance and inhibit aggressiveness towards infants constitute an 563 important biological foundation upon which humans, with their elaborate cognitive capacities, 564 ultimately developed institutionalized norms that prescribe appropriate behaviour towards 565
infants. This means that in modern, large-scale societies this social norm became explicitly 566 formulated in ethical as well as in legal codes and that perpetrators are officially prosecuted, 567 condemned and sent to prison. Finally, we will discuss possible experiments in chimpanzees 568 to test our framework. Males regularly hunt and patrol the boundaries of their territory and chimpanzee females 574 everywhere are very caring mothers. These behaviours are acquired under strong genetic 575 influences or largely through social learning, or some combination. 576
However, so far, there seem to be no reports of bystander reactions when individuals 577 fail to comply with such behavioural regularities. Therefore, we propose to categorize 578 behavioural patterns that regularly occur in a social group but upon violation provoke no 579 bystander reactions as statistical behavioural regularities. We clearly separate them from 580 those behavioural regularities that, upon violation, provoke reactions from bystanders and as 581 such might an evolutionary precursor of a social norm, as such. As shown above, there are 582 situations in which chimpanzees are sensitive to how other group members behave and thus 583 do react to such incidents. Therefore, as discussed above, the occurrence and nature of 584 bystander reactions towards an individual that shows deviant behaviour constitute a crucial 585 feature to distinguish behavioural regularities that are merely statistical from such that might 586 be -normative". together with an inhibition of aggression is largely conditioned by a genetic disposition and 598 mediated through the summed stimulus value of specific infantile characteristics. In contrast 599 to violating a mere statistical behavioural regularity, a serious violation of tolerance towards 600 infants almost invariably produces vehement reactions from bystanders as we have seen. 601
Here, we examine in more detail how such reactions might be explained, and offer three 602 possible interpretations, from purely mechanistic to fully moral. 603 Since incidents with a high intensity of aggressive arousal have a strong social 617 facilitative effect in nonhuman primates (Hall 1964) other group members are immediately 618 brought on to the scene harassing the perpetrator. Such a scenario might be erroneously 619 interpreted as a collective effort to -punish‖ the perpetrator. Bystander reactions that can be 620 best explained this way probably don't reflect violated social expectations about the 621 appropriate behaviour towards infants and hence most likely do also not involve emotions 622 comparable to indignation on the part of the bystander towards the perpetrator. Thus, 623 bystanders in this category probably do not possess any specific inference on how the distress 624 of an infant and the behaviour of a perpetrator are linked together and thus are not able to 625 perceive harming infants as a norm violation per se. Note, however, that this interpretation 626 relies on assuming the existence of some automatic reactions, such as the emotional linkage 627 among group members and thus strong social facilitation of aggression. These assumptions 628 need not be parsimonious. 629
(2) Proto social norm: If bystander reactions cannot be explained by simple stimulus-630 response mechanisms, then it might be that bystanders respond to the specific context namely 631 that -an individual harms an infant‖. In short, they respond to the norm violation per se. In 632 this case, bystander reactions most likely reflect violated social expectations, and therefore 633 their reactions might also involve emotions comparable to indignation in humans, which in 634 our species is often the driving force to punish wrongdoers. The step from a quasi social norm 635 to a proto social norm whose violation per se produces distinct reactions from bystanders 636 most likely necessitates the capacity to exhibit some empathetic competence, because this 637 would enable bystanders to understand the mistreated infant's and its mother's distress to 638 some extent and also its cause. To date, it seems that apes but probably not monkeys exhibit 639 empathetic competence because monkeys seem to lack the capacity to attribute mental states 640 to others (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Povinelli et al. 1991; Tomasello and Call 1997) . 641 Accordingly, macaque mothers fail to appreciate their infants' distress after an aggression and 642 display no concern for their infants' need for comfort (Schino et al. 2004 ). As discussed 643 above, chimpanzees are argued to be capable of some cognitive processing of others 644 emotional states that exceeds mere emotional contagion ( fully and accurately the emotional state of a maltreated infant and that of its mother. In short, 670 humans are endowed with advanced empathetic and cognitive abilities, which enable us to 671 grasp the full extent and far-reaching consequences of child abuse, which in turn increases our 672 reaction of indignation towards child molesters. 673 Importantly, in humans indignation is not only communicated on a behavioural but 674 also on a linguistic level. This means that with the advent of linguistic capacities, humans 675 became able to communicate among each other about the deviant behaviour of others and 676 articulate their indignation towards it, finally labelling deviant behaviours as something 677 -wrong‖. Perhaps the major consequence of language in the context of morality is that it can 678 create a consensus among group members concerning a fully fledged moral system composed 679 of abstract ethical concepts of right and wrong. The emergence of many uniquely human 680 cognitive capacities including language and active teaching are tightly linked to and follow 681 from shared intentionality, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically (Tomasello et al. 2005) . 682
It seems that this capacity not only plays a crucial role in how humans share information 683 about their cultural world with each other but also how humans share emotions (which are 684 argued to be relevant for moral behaviour) with each other. Shared intentionality is a suite of 685 cognitive skills, i.e. the understanding of other's psychological states, and of motivational 686 skills, i.e. the strong desire to share them (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007) . 687
Chimpanzees do to some extent understand the psychological states of their 688 conspecifics as we have seen but they seem not to go beyond this in that they attempt to share 689 them. Consequently, chimpanzees might experience -indignation‖ by the sight of severe 690 aggression against infants in a fairly individualistic way since they are not able to form a 691 -common psychological ground‖ (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007) , namely a shared state of 692 indignation towards harming infants. In analogy to shared intentionality, shared indignation 693 goes beyond the simultaneous experience of indignation by different individuals but rather 694 includes the awareness that -we collectively experience the same emotions to this specific 695 social event‖, which in turn can lead to collective protest and condemnation of the perpetrator. 696
This exemplifies the collective character of a human social norm. It is this collectivity upon 697 which the viability and the enforceability of a social norm ultimately rest on and which on 698 current evidence appears to be absent in chimpanzees. Further below, we will resume the 699 importance of shared intentionality and the collectivity enabled by it. 700
Third-party punishment is another feature of human social norms that deserve further 701 discussion because it is considered to be a critical characteristic of human social norms (Fehr 702 and Fischbacher 2002). As we have discussed earlier in this paper, except for the alpha male 703 and on rare occasions also other group members, chimpanzees, unlike humans, don't readily 704 impose punishment on those who transgress against others. There might be several reasons 705 for that. First, as proposed for humans, the risk of retaliation might limit the extent to which 706 chimpanzees punish transgressions against others. In chimpanzees, interference in an ongoing 707 conflict can provoke retaliation from aggressors (Goodall 1971 (Goodall , 1986 . Second, redirected 708 aggression after an original conflict, known to occur in chimpanzees , 709 might also limit the extent to which bystanders adopt a prominent role during and after 710
conflicts. This especially might concern female bystanders whose physical strength is inferior 711 to that of a male (Finch 1943) , despite the moderate sexual dimorphism in chimpanzees 712 (Leigh and Shea 1995; Pusey et al. 2005 ). Third, although chimpanzees live in permanent 713 social groups, they exhibit a fission-fusion social structure (Goodall 1986 ), which means that 714 individuals of the same group spend their time alone in the forest or associate in subgroups 715 which may vary in composition over hours and days (Reynolds 2005; Williams et al. 2002) . 716
Such a social structure might reduce the chance that bystanders, willing to punish, detect a 717 possible norm violation. 718
The near-absence of third-party punishment in chimpanzees must be weighed against 719 the evidence for humans. A recent cross-cultural study suggests that third-party punishment is 720 not essential for norm enforcement. In small-scale societies of hunter-gatherers, second-party 721 punishment seems to be sufficient to guarantee norm adherence ( One way to test possible candidates of evolutionary precursors of social norms in 870 chimpanzees and the social expectations that might underlie them is to assume the existence 871 of a certain social expectation and then to violate it. Based on the fact that chimpanzee infants 872 enjoy almost unlimited tolerance and hence seem to occupy a special status within their 873 groups, we have proposed that tolerance towards infants could constitute a possible universal 874 social norm in chimpanzees, and argued that severe aggression against them might violate 875 chimpanzee's social expectation about how to treat infants. We also proposed a preliminary 876 theoretical framework to decide whether the extreme tolerance, which is afforded to 877 chimpanzee infants, constitutes only a statistical behavioural regularity or whether it 878 constitutes an evolutionary precursor of a norm, as such. Finally, we proposed experimental 879 paradigms to test this. As discussed, a fully-fledged moral system including collective social 880 norms and abstract principles of good and wrong is beyond the capacities of chimpanzees. 881
However, if chimpanzees differentially evaluate social events as -disinterested‖ bystanders 882 then this can be regarded as an important step from amoral towards moral behaviour, 883 especially in social contexts related to harm. 884
Although this paper focused exclusively on chimpanzees, other animals (e.g. social 885
canids, elephants), whose natural history resembles that of humans in various aspects 886 (division of labour, systematic food-sharing, shared care of young and impaired individuals), 887
should also be considered when discussing the evolution of moral behaviour (Bekoff 2001 (Bekoff , 888 2004 ). Thus, the question whether chimpanzees or -any animal whatever, endowed with well-889 marked social instincts‖ as Darwin (1871/1982) put it, form social expectations about how 890 others, especially infants, should be treated has great potential, and gives us important 891 insights into the presence of specific social norms in humans and furthermore is highly 892 relevant for the understanding of the evolution of moral behaviour. 
